In his recent book Waar geest is, is vrijheid [Where there is mind, there is freedom], Guus Labooy sets forth an original and intriguing argument, inspired by the work of John Duns Scotus, for substance dualism in the philosophy of mind. In this paper we argue that his argument, although worthy of serious attention, is under-supported. In section 2 we question the significance of the particular scotistic notion of freedom he uses in his argument, even though we agree with his (...) premise that humans do possess freedom in the libertarian sense. In section 3 we argue that Labooy fails to make his key contention that significant freedom requires an irreducible immaterial soul sufficiently plausible. The key problem is that he does not consider the work of physicalists who also believe in libertarian freedom. In addition, it is not self-evident that an immaterial soul, as opposed to a physical body, can possess significant freedom. This requires argument. In section 4 we comment on Labooy’s specific conception of dualism and advise him to change it into a conception in which the soul — and not the composition of soul and body — is the human person, for the latter conception has absurd consequences. (shrink)

The cell assembly as a simple attractor cannot explain many cognitive phenomena. It must be a highly structured network that can sustain highly structured excitation patterns. Moreover, a cell assembly must be more widely distributed in space than on a square millimeter.

Many biological systems experience a periodic environment. Floquet theory is a mathematical tool to deal with such time periodic systems. It is not often applied in biology, because linkage between the mathematics and the biology is not available. To create this linkage, we derive the Floquet theory for natural systems. We construct a framework, where the rotation of the Earth is causing the periodicity. Within this framework the angular momentum operator is introduced to describe the Earth’s rotation. The Fourier operators (...) and the Fourier states are defined to link the rotation to the biological system. Using these operators, the biological system can be transformed into a rotating frame in which the environment becomes static. In this rotating frame the Floquet solution can be derived. Two examples demonstrate how to apply this natural framework. (shrink)

Over the past decades, mood enhancement effects of various drugs and neuromodulation technologies have been proclaimed. If one day highly effective methods for significantly altering and elevating one’s mood are available, it is conceivable that the demand for them will be considerable. One urgent concern will then be what role physicians should play in providing such services. The concern can be extended from literature on controversial demands for aesthetic surgery. According to Margaret Little, physicians should be aware that certain aesthetic (...) enhancement requests reflect immoral social norms and ideals. By granting such requests, she argues, doctors render themselves complicit to a collective ‘evil’. In this paper, we wish to question the extent to which physicians, psychiatrists and/or neurosurgeons should play a role as ‘moral gatekeepers’ in dealing with suspect demands and norms underlying potential desires to alter one’s mood or character. We investigate and discuss the nature and limits of physician responsibilities in reference to various hypothetical and intuitively problematic mood enhancement requests. (shrink)

Old Assyrian Legal Practices: Law and Dispute in the Ancient Near East. By Thomas Klitgaard Hertel. PIHANS, vol. 123. Leiden: Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten, 2013. Pp. xlii + 479. €84.80.

Nudges have gained popularity as a behavioral change tool that aims to facilitate the selection of the sensible choice option by altering the way choice options are presented. Although nudges are designed to facilitate these choices without interfering with people’s prior preferences, both the relation between individuals’ prior preferences and nudge effectiveness, as well as the notion that nudges ‘facilitate’ decision-making have received little empirical scrutiny. Two studies examine the hypothesis that a social proof nudge is particularly effective when people (...) have no clear prior preference, either because people are indifferent (in a colour-categorization task; Study 1, N = 255) or because people experience a choice conflict (making shopping decisions about meat products; Study 2, N = 97). Both studies employed a social proof nudge to steer participants’ choices. The potential facilitating effect of the nudge was tested using a mouse-tracker paradigm that implicitly assessed experienced uncertainty during decision-making. Results showed that the nudge was effective in steering participants’ decisions; the facilitation effect (i.e., reduced uncertainty regarding the decision) was only observed for conflicting preferences, but not under indifference. A better understanding of when and how nudges can influence individuals’ behavior may help in deciding whether nudges are an appropriate policy tool for changing particular undesirable behavior. (shrink)

Healey et al. introduce the special issue with a brief overview of work on communication in the Cognitive Sciences and some of the historical and conceptual influences that have marginalized the study of miscommunication. Drawing on more recent work in Cognitive Science and Conversation Analysis they argue that miscommunication is in fact a highly structured, ubiquitous phenomenon that is fundamental to human interaction.

Is there ever any reason for a doctor to lie to a patient? In this paper, we critically review the literature on lying to patients and challenge the common notion that while lying is unacceptable, a related entity--'benevolent deception' is defensible. Further, we outline a rare circumstance when treating psychotic patients where lying to the patient is justified. This circumstance is illustrated by a clinical vignette.

Les thèses, proposées par M. Krämer, dans son ouvrage Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles, marqueraient une révolution dans les études platoniciennes, si elles étaient acceptables. Selon lui, Platon a, dès le commencement de sa carrière philosophique, au moins dès l'ouverture de l'Académie, possédé un système élaboré d'ontologie. Ce système a été exposé aux membres de l'Académie, sous forme d'une doctrine ésotêrique. Les dialogues, qui sont entièrement des œuvres protreptiques, ne comportent que des allusions à cette doctrine; tout de même, sans (...) connaître ce fonds doctrinal, on ne peut vraiment comprendre les dialogues. Sans vouloir dresser un compte-rendu complet du livre en question, l'auteur du présent article voulait écrire quelques notes marginales. Ni le récit d'Aristoxène, ni les données plus tardives n'autorisent M. Kr. à déclarer que la fameuse conférence πεϱ τἀγαϑοῦ ait constitué une série de cours. En outre, le récit même n'est pas exempt d'invraisemblance, si l'on compare les fragments des poètes de la comédie moyenne. La dépréciation de l'œuvre écrite que contient la fin du Phèdre n'est pas absolue, comme le croît M. Krämer, mais relative. Dans la vue de M. Kr., il est difficile de comprendre pourquoi Platon a écrit. Surtout la composition des Lois est inexplicable. Dans la théorie d'un système ésotérique, l'héritage de Socrate ne reste plus reconnaissable. Si, comme dans les théories de M. Krämer, l'axiologie se confond avec l'ontologie, l'autonomie de la décision éthique disparaît, et la position priviligiée du Bien ne peut plus être comprise. Le refus de tout développement chez Platon contraint M. Krämer à donner des interprétations très forcées de plusieurs textes platoniciens. (shrink)